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I think they'd have to use a different base board - the C2 uses an Amlogic S905, which as far as I know doesn't support USB3.


> For example, using it sleep tracking, or for waking you via vibration (as not to disturb your partner)

Yes, the pebble is great for that.

> or even just allowing your phone to detect that you're asleep so it can turn on do-not-disturb.

Wouldn't it just be able to detect that if you plug it in at night?


Yes i started using Pebble last month. I like it. I had to charge once per week, charges within an hour and its not a smartphone juice drainer (i use BlackBerry Z10). Though number of applications and support is good in Android/iOS for obvious reasons.


It's not an increase in obscurity though: https://github.com/WebAssembly/design/blob/master/TextFormat...

The format is intentionally being built in a way that you can look at the source, in the same way you would look at minified Javascript currently.

If you're worried about obscurity, look at what is generated by asm.js. WebAssembly won't be any worse than that (and is, in fact, more or less a more efficient/correct equivalent to asm.js).


SQRL relies on phone cameras and QR codes, for one


Why would you make all of your commit messages "1", instead of explaining what the added code does in each?


I'm a single developer, imo no one will read these messages until Beta version.


You can already use TLS client certificates - the UI is just terrible is all.


The problem with hashes of hashes is now instead of the password being directly grabbed, the hash is directly grabbed, which can be thrown through the challenge-response system with no problem.

This only mitigates knowing the password itself, not anything to do with authentication.


> The problem with hashes of hashes is now instead of the password being directly grabbed, the hash is directly grabbed, which can be thrown through the challenge-response system with no problem.

But now you have to grab the hash first from one of the endpoints, MITMing the connection no longer suffices to impersonate the user.

I suppose public key schemes would be preferable, but deploying those isn't feasible for a lot of use cases.



It mitigates passive MITM attacks, for one.

On the other hand, there's nothing that's made _worse_ by choosing to do it that way. Plenty of things that are the same, some things better, but nothing worse.


Hardly - if you are not using HTTPS in the first place then sending the hash across the wire instead of the password are the least of your worries.


Mozilla Persona / BrowserID might be of interest to you.


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