Wow Peter, thanks for that. I like their analysis.
It reminded me of a great article I read years ago that dealt with the issue of self-referential paradox. In fact, at the time I tried applying the techniques therein towards the surprise examination, however I didn't get anywhere.
It's a paper by Noson Yanofsky entitled "A Universal Approach to Self-Referential Paradoxes, Incompleteness and Fixed Points" (http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0305282)
I think you'll enjoy reading it. I read the paper on a long train ride loved working out how given "Ann believes that Bob believes that Ann believes that Bob has a false belief about Ann" asking "does Ann believe that Bob has a false belief about Ann?" results in a paradox. This is supposedly called Brandenburger’s Epistemic Paradox.
Thanks, downloaded. I have to read the paper I quoted a few more times before I grok it fully. Perhaps it will be clearer after reading the one you cite, which appears most intriguing.
Thanks again!
EDIT: Just started reading. Mind already blown by the clarity of the "limitation, not paradox" idea. Slowing down for a longer, deeper, read.
It reminded me of a great article I read years ago that dealt with the issue of self-referential paradox. In fact, at the time I tried applying the techniques therein towards the surprise examination, however I didn't get anywhere.
It's a paper by Noson Yanofsky entitled "A Universal Approach to Self-Referential Paradoxes, Incompleteness and Fixed Points" (http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0305282)
I think you'll enjoy reading it. I read the paper on a long train ride loved working out how given "Ann believes that Bob believes that Ann believes that Bob has a false belief about Ann" asking "does Ann believe that Bob has a false belief about Ann?" results in a paradox. This is supposedly called Brandenburger’s Epistemic Paradox.
Anyway, thanks again for your reference.