Restricting brain activity to computation it becomes more difficult to find exceptions to the argument. I think this is because computation is fundamentally quite alien to human minds, insofar as it is not an elementary, inescapable mental state. Many philosophers of mind (though not all, particularly not those who adhere to reductive physicalism and eliminative materialism) would characterise phenomenal consciousness and intentionality as these unavoidable mental properties.
It is worth mentioning that there are at least good reasons to reject nearly all of these theories (including physicalist and material thesis). Many aspects of each theories turn out to imply highly unintuitive effects. But I would recommend you read for yourself, since the mind-body problem is immense and very interesting at every step. The SEP articles on both of these[1][2] are quite good.
Elsewhere in this thread some have pointed out that the ontological assumptions of philosophers fade away as we approach the mind in our inquiry. This is at least partly because the mind stretches our understanding of knowledge and matter themselves, and to an even greater degree, our intuitions thereof.
It is worth mentioning that there are at least good reasons to reject nearly all of these theories (including physicalist and material thesis). Many aspects of each theories turn out to imply highly unintuitive effects. But I would recommend you read for yourself, since the mind-body problem is immense and very interesting at every step. The SEP articles on both of these[1][2] are quite good.
Elsewhere in this thread some have pointed out that the ontological assumptions of philosophers fade away as we approach the mind in our inquiry. This is at least partly because the mind stretches our understanding of knowledge and matter themselves, and to an even greater degree, our intuitions thereof.
[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/
[2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/; see especially ยง4.