First, that's still beside the point. You shouldn't evaluate a password scheme solely by entropy if it is a password you intend to memorize. XKCD argues that it's easier to remember 4 random words than 8 random characters.
Second, your example isn't very good because it assumes that every 8 byte character (save one) is acceptable, which is rarely the case, especially if you are trying to memorize them.
Finally, as another commenter pointed out, you've got your math wrong, and even your example has more entropy for the words than the characters.
Yep, and that's assuming 8 random bytes from extended ASCII. The other point of the article was that nobody actually makes a password from random characters because words are easier to remember. And I think it's disingenuous to suppose people will enter alt-codes and that nonprintable characters would be allowed, so assuming MENSA-quality users with internal random number generators, we get 95^8 ~= 6.6E15, a clear loss of entropy.
>the 8 char password has much less entropy: 95^8 ~= 6.63E15 //
Most of the word usage is going to be limited though too. testyourvocab.com put the average at 27k I think. We're looking for words one can remember easily so the word pool is going to be a lot lower - 15000^4 ~= 5E16 FWIW.
real complex passwords are more like '"^vmds!w*é$sé550µW"'-à the point of the post was to show the maximum theorical possibilities for both.
As many pointed out not all 255 are usually printable and not all 171K words are used
then that's for english only and not counting old english and not taking care of possible punctuation
