Russia’s truck logistic support, which would be crucial in an invasion of Eastern Europe, is limited by the number of trucks and range of operations. It is possible to calculate how far trucks can operate using simple beer math. Assuming the existing road network can support 45 mph speeds, a single truck can make three trips a day at up to a 45-mile range: One hours to load, one hour to drive to the supported unit, one hours to unload, and another hour to return to base. Repeating this cycle three times equals 12 hours total. The rest of the day is dedicated to truck maintenance, meals, refueling, weapons cleaning, and sleeping. Increase the distance to 90 miles, and the truck can make two trips daily. At 180 miles, the same truck is down to one trip a day. These assumptions won’t work in rough terrain or where there is limited/damaged infrastructure. If an army has just enough trucks to sustain itself at a 45-mile distance, then at 90 miles, the throughput will be 33 percent lower. At 180 miles, it will be down by 66 percent. The further you push from supply dumps, the fewer supplies you can replace in a single day.
The resupply line from Belarus to the outskirts of Kyiv is more than 100 miles and over "back roads" - definitely not highway roads.
Ok but then what was the plan for driving to Paris during the cold war? Surely there's enough support vehicles to do that, and so there should be enough to get to your own back yard?
1) The point of the article is that the Russian logistics is primarily rail-based. Once they are forced to use trucks, they will struggle. Also, the plan was a 2-3 day assault which would not have required a resupply. Now the initial supplies have run out and they are struggling to resupply. A "40 mile convoy" that has not moved substantially in a couple of days is a massive logistics failure.
2) "Driving to Paris" during the cold war was a different time and a different place. And they never attempted it, so you cannot assume it would have been a success.
Their routes into Ukraine in the north and east do not appear to have rail lines for logistics. Note that they have had more success in the south where they likely have a better logistics supply line (more roads, probably better roads, closer to "friendly" territory).
Russia’s truck logistic support, which would be crucial in an invasion of Eastern Europe, is limited by the number of trucks and range of operations. It is possible to calculate how far trucks can operate using simple beer math. Assuming the existing road network can support 45 mph speeds, a single truck can make three trips a day at up to a 45-mile range: One hours to load, one hour to drive to the supported unit, one hours to unload, and another hour to return to base. Repeating this cycle three times equals 12 hours total. The rest of the day is dedicated to truck maintenance, meals, refueling, weapons cleaning, and sleeping. Increase the distance to 90 miles, and the truck can make two trips daily. At 180 miles, the same truck is down to one trip a day. These assumptions won’t work in rough terrain or where there is limited/damaged infrastructure. If an army has just enough trucks to sustain itself at a 45-mile distance, then at 90 miles, the throughput will be 33 percent lower. At 180 miles, it will be down by 66 percent. The further you push from supply dumps, the fewer supplies you can replace in a single day.
The resupply line from Belarus to the outskirts of Kyiv is more than 100 miles and over "back roads" - definitely not highway roads.