I do not think that an unpredictable loose cannon could be referred to as a "puppet state", no. Although China has been (and still is) North Korea's largest source of aid, China has also been distancing themselves from North Korea over the past decade.
China is a very different, and very complicated situation, but they are currently enjoying more political influence than at any time in recent history, and as they are poised to become a dominant world power, North Korea is a liability that they may well decide that they cannot afford.
I would also point out that our respective notions of "live on" must be a bit different; assuming that the data I've read can be trusted, North Korea has almost no paved roads at all [1], which means that the movement of supplies throughout the country is badly hindered. Given the well-known height differences between North Koreans and their South Korean neighbors, the gulags and other oppressions mentioned in this article and others, the threats which North Korea uses to squeeze aid in the form of energy and other supplies from other nations, their nearly complete lack of electrical lighting after dark, and what's known of their trade with China, I find it difficult to see North Korea as being on anything more than the barest of life support from China.
> North Korea is a liability that they may well decide that they cannot afford.
Hard to tell. On the other hand, their influence over North Korea is an asset they can use in negotiations with other superpowers. Plus, they start to look good in comparison.
I've not gotten the impression that North Korea really likes China, just that they tolerate them (because they are the only ones willing to deal with them). Maybe things will change a bit now, but I was always under the impression that N.K. could have easily lobbed a nuke at China 'just because.' That kind of uncertainty is a liability.
My impression is that at this point 'puppet' is far too strong a term.
North Korea still relies on the PRC's tolerance and patronage, and the PRC doesn't prefer any outcome that boosts the influence of the US and South Korea. But the PRC's influence and patience with North Korea are limited. Some of the Wikileaks cables indicate China has begun backing away from the regime:
North Korea is a vassal state of the PRC, and exists because it is politically advantageous to China for them to do so.
Until recently, China hasn't liked to take a direct approach to many aspects of international affairs. So they influence countries like North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran as tools to achieve their political aims.
They aren't whole-hearted supporters of all aspects of the North Korean regime, frankly, I'd say that they don't really care about what happens in North Korea, as long as they are achieving their foreign policy goals.
China's interests (and hence, position) are "don't fuck around and create trouble for us".
A collapsed NK state creates more trouble for China in the form of refugees than a still-functioning one, so we see enough aid for them to keep functioning.
An occasional diplomatic poke in the eye to the US helps China too, but that's a want, not a need. Don't confuse the rhetoric with the reality.
Yeah, in the event of actual war, there's no way they intervene as long as the North Koreans are the aggressors -- they know North Korea will lose on its own, and they don't want to get into a fight with the US. South Korea's one of their major trading partners now, too.
I think they let a US/SK operation clean up while issuing various diplomatic missives decrying the violence, then wrangle a treaty barring major military installations or exercises in northern areas of, and establishing free trade with, the reunified Korea.
Partly because MacArthur was looking (and talking) like he was going to press on into China as he stormed up the peninsula after the landings at Incheon.
Indeed, but it also has some factors in common through different pathways - I grow nervous when I read of the ultranationalist riots permitted by the Party, because it seems like the kind of thing that would itself to the leaders deciding to enter 'a short, victorious war'. (Defending the Middle Kingdom, defending the Revolution; rather similar.)
Entirely different, see my comment above about Deng Xiaopeng's ascendance in the late 1970s and the quite severe repercussions for the perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution. There's no linkage between the revolution and nationalism anymore. "A cat that catches mice is a good cat, whether it's white or black".
Nationalist pride, sure, that's been a constant through any cohesive nation's history. Koreans aren't Chinese, though, and the leaders of China are too smart to look for a "short, victorious war" on the Korean peninsula..
Mao's China was far more brutal and crazy than modern China, and 1950 North Korea was to some degree less brutal and crazy than modern North Korea. In 1950 they were peas in a pod. Since then, they have grown in different directions.
China wasn't a growing economic powerhouse in 1950. In fact, it didn't have much of an economy, period. They've made too much progress, established too many economic links, gained too much international influence to throw it away on a stupid war that, even in "victory", would be a loss.
They don't even have an idealogical interest -- we throw around the word "communist", but North Korea's modern ideologies are so far removed from Chinese communism that it's practically apples and oranges.
And the Cold War is long over, nobody's out to "eradicate" or even "contain" communism. US-Chinese relations are strained, but not hostile, and they know we wouldn't be looking to cross the Yalu.
Even more than the macro factors, the 1950s Chinese state was a revolutionary state bent on the worldwide spread of communism.
In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaopeng killed off the last group of leaders trying to keep that sentiment alive (the Gang of Four) and since then they've been all pragmatism, all the time. Any talk of communism is window-dressing, their regime is ideologically committed to doing what's practical.
So even aside from the cost-benefit, they have no ideological incentive to throw their lot in with the North Korean gov't. As I said upthread, the reason they give them aid right now is because a refugee crisis in Manchuria would be inconvenient. Pragmatism.
It's my understanding that NK is far from a PRC puppet state, and have a strained relationship, but being that NK depends heavily on China for it's continued existence and security, they do have some sway.
Kim Jong Il has conducted several actions, like the 2006 nuclear test, which has embarrassed and/or annoyed China considerably, underneath the public facade.
Saying NK is a PRC puppet is like saying South Korea is a US puppet.
China is glad NK exists as a buffer against the US zone of influence (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan), but NK causes China a lot of problems too (eg, there is a crystal-meth problem in the border zones because North Korea produces it as a medicine(!!)[1])
