> Christopher Hitchens was right: Kissinger was a war criminal so I tend to regard this kind of verbatim report as reflecting two criminally minded geniuses shooting the breeze together.
Perhaps, but the trade arrangements made at that meeting have essentially been policy for every Administration since. That's very interesting. What to make of that? Why have no U.S. Presidents (except, maybe, maybe in rhetoric, Trump) wanted something different? The point is that Kissinger figured out something very important, and got it done, and it's lasted half a century. Policy momentum is a fascinating thing, and how to arrange for it.
Another question I have is why Mao's intense hostility to the Soviets. Yes, Kruschev's Secret Speech was the cause of their schism, but why did all the premiers who followed Kruschev fail to right things with the Chinese? And why did Kruschev not find a way to smooth things with Mao? "Look, that Speech is not an attack on you, it's just me shoring up support in the USSR by attacking Stalin, and that works because Stalin made himself so feared, m'kay?" And why wouldn't that work, as long as the Speech stayed Secret and even if not, as long as it stayed out of the public eye in China? Well, ok, Kruschev couldn't keep it that secret, but still, the premiers that followed him could have denounced that speech and made things ok with China. But this hostility survived Mao's death, even when Deng Xiaoping essentially (but not overtly) accepted Kruschev's position against personality cults! Why? Only now, maybe, the Russians are finally repairing that schism.
Really, TFA is extremely interesting.
And yes, it's clear that to some degree Mao and Kissinger were playing roles, being flattering and saying things they probably didn't really mean.
And then there's Mao's quip about Americans not being "awakened". Who knows what he meant, but Kissinger either did or pretended. Mao might have meant something very pedestrian, or perhaps something sinister, or perhaps something very good -- it'd be good to know.
I'm not all the way through reading this and I'm just full of questions.
Say what you will about the protagonists, but these memos are riveting.
The soviets were patronising. Mao resented Stalin's operatives telling him what to do all the time pre 49. Post 49, nothing much Russia did was in China's longterm interest. China and India were in border dispute which still rancours yet the soviets wanted some degree of amity with India, leading the non aligned nations in the UN there was much for them to profit from not supporting China across that boundary dispute. The Korean war probably started overt resentments which had things like inner/outer Mongolia to stew over since day 1. When Russia blew hot, China was cold, and vice versa. When Russia went with peaceful coexistence China was still militant. In the end, they were "much too much in love to get along"
> Perhaps, but the trade arrangements made at that meeting have essentially been policy for every Administration since. That's very interesting. What to make of that? Why have no U.S. Presidents (except, maybe, maybe in rhetoric, Trump) wanted something different? The point is that Kissinger figured out something very important, and got it done, and it's lasted half a century. Policy momentum is a fascinating thing, and how to arrange for it.
It's no great secret, the US business community wanted access to China's huge market. That's been true since the 1800s. Nixon and Kissinger, and their successors, especially Clinton, were just acting in their political donors' interest. That's why it happened and why it lasted, until Xi and Trump at least.
Perhaps, but the trade arrangements made at that meeting have essentially been policy for every Administration since. That's very interesting. What to make of that? Why have no U.S. Presidents (except, maybe, maybe in rhetoric, Trump) wanted something different? The point is that Kissinger figured out something very important, and got it done, and it's lasted half a century. Policy momentum is a fascinating thing, and how to arrange for it.
Another question I have is why Mao's intense hostility to the Soviets. Yes, Kruschev's Secret Speech was the cause of their schism, but why did all the premiers who followed Kruschev fail to right things with the Chinese? And why did Kruschev not find a way to smooth things with Mao? "Look, that Speech is not an attack on you, it's just me shoring up support in the USSR by attacking Stalin, and that works because Stalin made himself so feared, m'kay?" And why wouldn't that work, as long as the Speech stayed Secret and even if not, as long as it stayed out of the public eye in China? Well, ok, Kruschev couldn't keep it that secret, but still, the premiers that followed him could have denounced that speech and made things ok with China. But this hostility survived Mao's death, even when Deng Xiaoping essentially (but not overtly) accepted Kruschev's position against personality cults! Why? Only now, maybe, the Russians are finally repairing that schism.
Really, TFA is extremely interesting.
And yes, it's clear that to some degree Mao and Kissinger were playing roles, being flattering and saying things they probably didn't really mean.
And then there's Mao's quip about Americans not being "awakened". Who knows what he meant, but Kissinger either did or pretended. Mao might have meant something very pedestrian, or perhaps something sinister, or perhaps something very good -- it'd be good to know.
I'm not all the way through reading this and I'm just full of questions.
Say what you will about the protagonists, but these memos are riveting.