1) was a USAF aircraft, a 2-engine Bombardier aircraft. Despite the name, this is a small civilian jetliner. "Loud bang" and engine failure in cruise. "Because the warning signal did not immediately light up for the catastrophically damaged left engine — it took several seconds for its RPMs to drop below the point that would have triggered the signal — the crew didn’t immediately know which engine had blown. The pilots thought the right engine had experienced the emergency, leading them to shut it down instead of the left one. The shutdown meant the plane now had no engines operating, and happened relatively quickly, about 24 seconds after the fan blade broke." A restart of the wrong engine was attempted while the good engine was kept shut down.
2) is a well known disaster. "The aircraft was on a scheduled flight from London Heathrow Airport to Belfast International Airport when a fan blade broke in the left engine, disrupting the air conditioning and filling the cabin with smoke. The pilots believed this indicated a fault in the right engine, since earlier models of the 737 ventilated the cabin from the right, and they were unaware that the 737-400 used a different system. The pilots mistakenly shut down the functioning engine. They selected full thrust from the malfunctioning one and this increased its fuel supply, causing it to catch fire. Of the 126 people aboard, 47 died and 74 sustained serious injuries."
3) is from 1969, and is something of a period piece. This plane had three pilots; two in seats with controls, and a third one as "pilot in command" supervising but with no access to the controls. His comment, afterward, was “It is perhaps not quite correct to be ultimately responsible for the safe handling of an aircraft in an emergency unless occupying a seat from where this can be done. I feel, somehow, that had I been occupying either of the pilot’s seats I might have reacted differently; on the other hand, it is possible that had I not been present the two pilots might also have reacted differently.” That strange setup may have been a holdover from the British early WWII "aircraft commander" concept. This was borrowed from naval practice, where the officer of the deck tells the junior people who are actually driving the ship what to do. It turned out to be a terrible idea in the air, where things happened faster. But somehow British United Airways was doing it in 1969. Nobody questioned the pilot in command deciding, wrongly, which engine had failed.
1) was a USAF aircraft, a 2-engine Bombardier aircraft. Despite the name, this is a small civilian jetliner. "Loud bang" and engine failure in cruise. "Because the warning signal did not immediately light up for the catastrophically damaged left engine — it took several seconds for its RPMs to drop below the point that would have triggered the signal — the crew didn’t immediately know which engine had blown. The pilots thought the right engine had experienced the emergency, leading them to shut it down instead of the left one. The shutdown meant the plane now had no engines operating, and happened relatively quickly, about 24 seconds after the fan blade broke." A restart of the wrong engine was attempted while the good engine was kept shut down.
2) is a well known disaster. "The aircraft was on a scheduled flight from London Heathrow Airport to Belfast International Airport when a fan blade broke in the left engine, disrupting the air conditioning and filling the cabin with smoke. The pilots believed this indicated a fault in the right engine, since earlier models of the 737 ventilated the cabin from the right, and they were unaware that the 737-400 used a different system. The pilots mistakenly shut down the functioning engine. They selected full thrust from the malfunctioning one and this increased its fuel supply, causing it to catch fire. Of the 126 people aboard, 47 died and 74 sustained serious injuries."
3) is from 1969, and is something of a period piece. This plane had three pilots; two in seats with controls, and a third one as "pilot in command" supervising but with no access to the controls. His comment, afterward, was “It is perhaps not quite correct to be ultimately responsible for the safe handling of an aircraft in an emergency unless occupying a seat from where this can be done. I feel, somehow, that had I been occupying either of the pilot’s seats I might have reacted differently; on the other hand, it is possible that had I not been present the two pilots might also have reacted differently.” That strange setup may have been a holdover from the British early WWII "aircraft commander" concept. This was borrowed from naval practice, where the officer of the deck tells the junior people who are actually driving the ship what to do. It turned out to be a terrible idea in the air, where things happened faster. But somehow British United Airways was doing it in 1969. Nobody questioned the pilot in command deciding, wrongly, which engine had failed.