Borrowing money to buy back stock is the opposite of funding: it's de-funding. It's the acquisition of liabilities with no offsetting acquisition of assets or future cash flows.
From an accounting standpoint it's funding-neutral: you assume a debt liability with offsetting reduction of the equity liability. This makes the return on invested capital larger, since the same profits get divided over less shares. The investors to whom the capital was returned can then invest that capital somewhere else.
It does make the company more vulnerable to economic downturns of course, since debt comes with mandatory payments that equity doesn't have. But making the tradeoff between larger profits and larger stability is what the investors hired managers for. If they don't like the tradeoffs being made, they should get different management or sell their stake in the poorly run business.
What gets me here is that bust out 1 happened after one bad holiday season to a company that was doing great the previous year. Another company in New Jersey (Toys R Us) had a similar one mistake year and ended up owned by Bain Capital -- the people who profited from the bust out weren't even part of company. Why is it that retail companies only get one strike before their stocks are pillaged leaving them crippled? Is there another market as ruthless as this?
You are looking at only two companies, not a representative sample of retailers. ANF, for example, has multiple "strikes" but they're still around. Retailers only become vulnerable to takeovers when investors lose confidence in management's competence. All other industries are equally ruthless.
In general the US still has a surplus of retail space. There will probably be more major bankruptcies in the next few years, which is fine. Let them die and more innovative companies will take their place.
Stocks and bonds (or loans) are both liabilities. Only difference is priority. Lenders have priority over shareholders in the event of a liquidation. If you own stock in a company and they're shifting from being funded by capital to being funded by debt, it mostly shouldn't matter unless they're going bankrupt, and in this case they clearly were headed that way and stockholders should have sold.
In some sense _the entire reason that companies exist_ is so that shareholders can at some point extract some money from the company and there's only two ways to do that -- either through dividends or growth. BB was (at best) clearly no longer a growth company, and stock buybacks are just dividends in disguise. They're a strong signal that you should be cashing out at least some of of your position as a stock holder while you can.
So what? It's just a change in capital structure. Most corporations are funded by a mix of equity and debt. On average, taking on some debt boosts shareholder returns despite the increased risk of bankruptcy.
> On average, taking on some debt boosts shareholder returns despite the increased risk of bankruptcy.
Define "shareholder".
The day trader? The hedge fund who wants a position for a few weeks/months? The pension fund that would like regular cash flow? The person with a retirement account that is dollar cost averaging into the market over a period of decades?
On average having some level of debt boosts shareholder returns. It does increase the risk of bankruptcy, but usually it's a net win. Smart shareholders are diversified so that the bankruptcy of any single company in their portfolio has minimal impact.
More interesting that debt to equity ratio, is what is done with the capital that is raised by either mechanism. Is it possible for investment into operations, marketing or strategic expansion or reduction to improve shareholder returns? Does CEO compensation that is well into the hundred million dollar range for performance that isn’t remarkable typically boost shareholder returns? These are questions that I think are more interesting to people running and governing companies. Even to CFOs which all know in their sleep the first year MBA financial engineering tricks of CAPM, WACC, and leverage to determine optimal capital structure.
The attitude conveyed in your last sentence should be a large red flog to a competent and attentive Board or share holder. First, it is of no concern to the management how much I am or am not diversified- management’s job is to optimally run a company, not my portfolio. Second, leveraging up a compsny in low interest rate times is likely largely increases systemic risk to the share holders which, according to Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory, is not reduced by diversification versus idiosyncratic risk, which is.
For an individual, perhaps. Even there some exceptions can be found though: taking on a mortgage to buy a house can be the right decision even though you could keep on renting and don't technically need to take on the debt.
For a business it gets much muddier: do they "need" to take on debt if it makes them more competitive in the market? A company with a well optimized capital structure containing both debt and equity can be much more profitable than a company without, and can use those extra profits to out-compete companies that are less efficient.
