You are confusing the TBD Devastator with the TBF/TBM Avenger. The Avenger was a very capable aircraft, certainly the best carrier-borne torpedo bomber and antisubmarine platform of the war.
The Swordfish did OK in the Atlantic solely because it never faced any meaningful fighter opposition (having been quickly relegated to "safer" roles), and the distances were low enough that its low speed was not a hindrance. It would have been utterly unsurvivable in the Pacific theater against Japanese opposition.
Additionally, short-range ASW aircraft were never really the problem in the Atlantic, the problem was always how to provide long-range cover, which was only solved by the use of land-based B-24s and carrier-borne Avengers.
> Additionally, short-range ASW aircraft were never really the problem in the Atlantic, the problem was always how to provide long-range cover, which was only solved by the use of land-based B-24s and carrier-borne Avengers.
If the US had large numbers of Fairey Swordfish guarding the US East Coast in 1941, they could have deployed aircraft carriers to win the Battle of the Atlantic. I imagine the US converting many surface combatants that were in production to aircraft carriers for their Europe-First plan.
These mythical carriers did not exist in 1941 and could not have. An absolutely immense number of escort carriers were built by the US during the war, and contributed heavily to the outcome in the outcome in the Atlantic, but there's no way they could have been ready in quantity before superior ASW aircraft were also ready in quantity.
Fundamentally, winning the Battle of the Atlantic relied on other technical means than mere aircraft alone: HF-DF, much better (and smaller) airborne radar, improved sonar, codebreaking, and improved ASW weapons. No single aircraft platform earlier in the war would meaningfully have changed the situation without these other improvements as well.
> These mythical carriers did not exist in 1941 and could not have.
Here is my alternate history scenario:
IF the US had Fairey Swordfish that had proven effective in combating Japanese submarines on the West Coast, Which they had but Admiral Nimitz did not believe the reports. The Fiarey Swordfish were superior ASW aircraft in 1934. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairey_Swordfish
And IF the US had hundreds or thousands more Fairey Swordfish they had built. This is the alternate history part. The US had the tools to set up an assembly line in storage and forgot to tell anyone after Prime Minister Churchill told President Roosevelt how important they were.
And IF the US had used those newly American-made Swordfish to drive the German U-boats away from the US East Coast, moving the Battle of the Atlantic farther out to sea,
And IF the US then wanted to convert any ship in production to be a light carrier designed to carry Fairey Swordfish and escort convoys,
I am not talking about magically building more Hornet or Essex class fleet carriers. I'm talking about changing history so that light cruisers were converted into escort carriers and Fairey Swordfish hunted U-boats in the Atlantic long before this really happened.
I contend 2 changes would have shortened World War 2 massively:
1. The US should have never mass-produced the Mark 14 torpedo and instead tested the heck out of the Mark 10.
2. The US should have mass-produced a variant of the Swordfish, instead of mass-producing the TBD as a torpedo plane.
I would love to move up the production of Kaiser's Escort Carriers, but that would be too risky. The magic of Kaiser's escort carriers could be sabotaged by a butterfly flapping its wings. I would only supply them with a bunch of Swordfish when they were available to go with their F4F Wildcats and SBD Dauntlesses.
I think you're giving the TBD a bad rap. Both were fundamentally obsolete aircraft at the start of the war for their primary role, and both were unsurvivable when used in that role.
The Swordfish acquired a somewhat mythic representation from performance early in the war, but that performance was a result of FAA doctrine rather than any particular characteristics of the Swordfish - the FAA was really the only service to take night carrier operations seriously pre-war, and most of the successful Swordfish operations were conducted at night. When operated in daylight against competent air defense they were just as vulnerable as the TBD.
Where the two also differ is that the TBD was soon retired completely following the slaughter at Midway and replaced by a much superior platform (the TBF/TBM), while the Swordfish was moved to other roles (e.g. ASW) as it was also replaced (also by the TBF/TBM in many cases). In no small part that was because the FAA needed everything it could get, and the failure of the intended successor (the Fairey Albacore) left them with no other domestic alternative.
The Swordfish did OK in the Atlantic solely because it never faced any meaningful fighter opposition (having been quickly relegated to "safer" roles), and the distances were low enough that its low speed was not a hindrance. It would have been utterly unsurvivable in the Pacific theater against Japanese opposition.
Additionally, short-range ASW aircraft were never really the problem in the Atlantic, the problem was always how to provide long-range cover, which was only solved by the use of land-based B-24s and carrier-borne Avengers.