The Shuttle program never properly calculated their risk in the first place because NASA admins preferred happy fiction. Only after Challenger broke up and slammed six professional astronauts and a school teacher into the ocean were the NASA admins forced to face realistic risk figures for the program.
Today, NASA as an institution has learned nothing from it. Their heat shield for Orion is defective and they tried to cover it up instead of admitting the problem. They're still proceeding under the assumption that they can simply ignore the hear shield not performing as designed if they use a different reentry profile, which they intend to do without first testing this theory.
Today, NASA as an institution has learned nothing from it. Their heat shield for Orion is defective and they tried to cover it up instead of admitting the problem. They're still proceeding under the assumption that they can simply ignore the hear shield not performing as designed if they use a different reentry profile, which they intend to do without first testing this theory.