I buy that in principle, though it'd work better if Senators represented a larger spectrum of opinions, rather than two fairly partisan camps. There's something like 5 Senators who regularly vote with the "other" side (e.g. Susan Collins from Maine), which means that you have a pretty bad situation whether either the chamber is 55-45 and nothing can pass, or it's 60-40 and everything the leading party wants can pass. If there were more of a gradation of politics, 60-40 would maybe lead to only the better ideas passing.

A related problem is that some things really should get done, such as replacing retired/deceased judges, which the Senate is way behind on due to the practice of the past few terms where basically all nominees get filibustered.

I'd be fine with requiring a 60% vote of the house, or votes representing 60% of the population. 40% of the senate represents less than 12% of the US population.

The Senate exists for one reason only: The slaveholding governors of Carolinas, Georgia, et. al would never have ratified the constitution if it was thought that slavery had a snowball's chance in hell of being abolished by the federal government.

Interestingly the Australian Senate was modelled on the US Senate, in as much as it was intended to give the smaller states a brake on federal power (and similarly was really a necessary carrot in order to get the smaller states on board with federation).

It's now a directly elected proportional-representation body, so 60% of Senators in that body would tend to represent a similar proportion of voters.

I'm a little shocked that this is being down voted given that its recounting what I thought was the consensus view of historians....

1) To get rid of a law, you have to pass a bill to repeal or change it. Most laws on the books were passed back when you only needed 51 votes in the Senate. Today, to change or repeal them, it would take 60 votes. Thus the increasing use of the filibuster directly results in government bloat and outdated laws.

2) The government is funded by annual appropriations bills. Gridlock results in omnibus continuing resolutions because it takes 60 votes to make any significant changes. Imagine if your business got to the end of every year and said "it's too hard to think up a budget for next year, let's just use the exact same budget as last year." No matter what happened last year.

I'm curious: do you think all elections should require a supermajority? Perhaps we shouldn't elect a President unless one candidate can get 60%? And why shouldn't all elective bodies require 60% to pass legislation? For that matter, shouldn't all corporate boards use the 60% threshold?

This notion that majority-rules is a great decision procedure everywhere EXCEPT the US Senate seems very odd to me.

I think an even more stringent bar for legislation would produce better legislation rather than more of it.

Why do you think requiring a supermajority increases the quality of legislation?

Why do you think there's a contradiction here? Is there some rule that says all elective bodies must have the same rules?

One doesn't. And so?

I haven't seen anyone proffer a reason to deviate from majority-rules decision procedure. If you think it benefits the Senate, then you should be able to articulate what those benefits are and explain why they other governing bodies wouldn't also benefit.

So, can anyone explain to me why corporate boards shouldn't adopt a 60% majority rule as well?

In the case of the Senate, it only requires a simple majority to pass legislation. Terminating debate is what requires a supermajority. That seems fair to me since the Senate is supposed to be extremely deliberative. Also, the 60% supermajority isn't even that arbitrary: two-thirds of the Senate are up for reelection every couple of years. The requirement of a 60% supermajority to terminate deliberation almost ensures that the debate will benefit from the members that can afford the longer-term outlook (i.e. 5-6 years).

The distinction between terminating debate and passing legislation is disingenuous. You can't pass legislation without terminating debate. Which means that you can't pass legislation unless you have 60%.

And of course it is arbitrary. In the recent past, the threshold was 66%, not 60%. And in the distant past, Senate norms precluded this sort of arbitrary interference.

Finally, the idea that the 60% threshold leads to more debate is silly. Consider how many judicial nominations are delayed for months but then sail through with 80-100% votes.

The fact of the matter is that at any given time there are three different classes of sitting senators. The requirement of supermajority that is around two-thirds reflects that there is a qualitative difference between a group that doesn’t face reelection for another half decade and one that is likely in campaign mode. Thus, the supermajority is actually a simple majority among the classes of senators.

Also, while a threat of a filibuster might not lead to more deliberation among the members, it certainly signals to the public that something important might be at stake. At the very least it will cause journalist to report and/or editorialize on the issue.

With regard to judicial nominations, I know that there are some shenanigans but I would also expect an ideal process to look just about identical since the floor vote should be delayed until each senator has performed an independent investigation of the nominee.

Why stop at 60%? Why not require 100% of the votes?

I think it's a straw man to say anyone is saying "the Senate has to pass lots of laws to be an effective organization".