Hacker Newsnew | past | comments | ask | show | jobs | submitlogin

What if the program doesn’t respect those env vars? Can Zerobox still block network calls in that case?


Great question! On Linux, yes, network namespaces enforce that and all net traffic goes through the proxy. Direct connections are blocked at the kernel level even if the program ignores proxy env vars, but I will test this case a bit more (unsure how to though, most network calls would respect HTTPS_PROXY and other similar env vars).

That being said, the default behaviour is no network, so nothing will be routed if it's not allowed regardless of whether the sandboxed process respects env vars or not.


Does this work inside of Podman containers?


How about on macOS?


On macOS, the proxy is best effort. Programs that ignore HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY can connect directly. This is a platform limitation (macOS Seatbelt doesn't support forced proxy routing).

BUT, the default behaviour (no net) is fully enforced at the kernel level. Domain filtering relies on the program respecting proxy env vars.


I thought seatbelt-exec had mechanisms for that?

  (allow network-outbound
    (remote tcp "127.0.0.1:8080"))


It does but because I'm inheriting the seatbelt settings from Codex, I'm not resetting it in Zerobox (I thought it's a safer option). Let me look into this, there should be a way to take Codex' profile and safely combine/modify it.




Consider applying for YC's Summer 2026 batch! Applications are open till May 4

Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | Legal | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: