If I am a self-obsessed evil dictator who is threatened with certain defeat, you think I am going to hold off on that master plan to take out a Blue carrier on the basis that Blue might nuke me?
There are too many if's. If you're threatened by certain defeat, I think your immediate concern is saving your own skin or avoid being back-stabbed. But this is a thought experiment. You could come up with a scenario where it's untrue, but that would only be a scenario.
Additionally, if you're faced with certain defeat, this means you've lost significant deterrence. If not, it would be more intelligent to exhibit your capabilities to negotiate a truce.
I was trying to illustrate a situation where the nuclear deterrent definitely doesn't apply.
I'll remove some conditions then.
In a war situation, Red will take out a Blue carrier regardless of Blue's nuclear deterrent because they are at war. The nuclear deterrent makes Red reluctant to get to the point of war. Once at war, Red will either surrender under the threat (and hence not be a threat), or call Blue's bluff.
Edit: Also, the position that "they wouldn't dare take out my carrier because of the atrocity I'd do to them in return" is not a sensible military strategy during war.
Of course nuclear deterrent doesn't apply in all cases and Red will definitely try to neutralize as many targets as they can and if they can sink all ships they will (that's what Japan tried to do in Pearl Harbor after all).
However, where I feel we disagree is that how Red does it is important as they don't want to allow Blue to gain allies or to give the possibility to Blue to react in a way that would otherwise been politically impossible (ie nuclear weapons).
While the nuclear capabilities may not deter the beginning of the war but if the political will is there to use that capability after such an attack, then it would possibly be a short war. So Red decides to strike and Blue returns with a nuke or three or dozen, exercise over. What's the point in that?
But you are right, history shows that a "deterrent" of any nature, not just related to war, is often not considered leading up to whatever it is supposed to deter.
I think it would be an interesting element in the simulation, that in order to actually beat Red, Blue would have to use nuclear weapons. It would show the limits of conventional warfare against asymmetric warfare, and as such be useful.
It would be good for the simulation to say that Blue should win without using nukes, and if using nukes, not damage the environment enough to make life hell for Blue and Blue's allies' populations.
Use of nuclear weapons against primary (i.e. military) targets that are isolated from civilian populations would not be an atrocity in this case. If e.g. Iran were to manage to sink a US aircraft carrier, I have no doubt that they would see the business end of some W80s, and justifiably so.
